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RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON APPEAL: THE DEFENDANT OF
INTERMEDIATE MEANS
Baggett v. Wainwright, 229 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1969)
Petitioner was convicted of grand larceny and of breaking and entering
with intent to commit a felony.1 An appeal was never filed, and petitioner
subsequently petitioned pro se to the Florida supreme court for a writ of
habeas corpus. He alleged that, although represented by private counsel at
trial, he was unable to retain appellate counsel because of his subsequent
indigency and that the trial judge knew of his indigency and advised him
that appellate counsel would be appointed. The court granted the petition
and HELD, the trial judge must inform a criminal defendant represented
by private counsel of his right to have counsel appointed for appeal when the
judge knows that the defendant has become indigent and desires to appeal.2
Since 1963, states have been required to supply indigent defendants with
appellate as well as trial counsel. 3 Additionally, courts must provide indigents seeking appeal with filing fees 4 and transcripts5 of the entire trial record, including briefs, transcripts of evidence, and clerk transcripts. 6 These
rights guaranteed to defendants who are initially indigent have not been
accorded in Florida to solvent individuals who subsequently become indigent
and lack appellate counsel. Until the instant case, the defendant of intermediate means received little judicial consideration in Florida.7
Federal courts have, however, considered this problem. In Pate v. Holman8 the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, held that when a
defendant has retained private trial counsel, the judge may presume that
this counsel will represent him on appeal. Moreover, the opinion stated
that, if he has become indigent, the defendant must inform the court of
his inability to retain counsel for appeal. Pate distinguished the right to
counsel at trial from the right to counsel on appeal and placed the burden of
initiating court appointment of appellate counsel on the defendant at
sentencing.0 The case would thus permit a defendant of intermediate means

1.

FLA. STAT. §§810.01, 811.021 (1967).

2. The court subsequently discharged the writ previously issued upon the finding of
a commissioner, appointed to resolve the factual allegations, that the trial judge had no
reason to believe the defendant was indigent. 235 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1970).
3. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel on appeal); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at trial). Moreover, the due process

and equal protection clauses require that an indigent be confronted with no more hurdles
in being heard by an appellate court than the rich man. Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S.
327, 330 (1969).
4. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
5. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
6. Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967).
7. E.g., McDaniel v. State, 219 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1969).
8. 341 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1965).

9. Id. at 773. As stated in the instant case: "This distinction is probably attributable to
the fact that the defendant himself is responsible for initiating appeal proceedings, whereas
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to remain unadvised of his right to have appellate counsel appointed if he
became indigent.10 The presumption that one who can afford counsel at
trial will not require court-appointed counsel on appeal has also been
adopted by Florida courts."
Although the right to appellate review in criminal cases is guaranteed
in Florida,12 the defendant must initiate appellate proceedings.'3 Thus, in
the instant case the court reasoned that, to prove a deprivation of constitutional rights, the petitioner had to show state action.'- The burden, therefore,
was upon the petitioner to demonstrate that the trial judge knew of both his
indigency and desire to appeal. 5 Thereafter, the judge's failure to act would
constitute the requisite state action.'
The court in the instant case discussed the situation where failure to
file an appeal is caused by omissions of appellate counsel appointed by the
court. This presents a different state action question than loss of appellate
rights caused by a trial judge. It was argued that since the risk of failing
to file a timely appeal might befall a nonindigent represented by private
counsel, this type of default should not be attributed to the state.17 The
court rejected this contention and stated that court-appointed counsel have
the constitutional duty to take certain minimum steps toward initiating
appeal, even if they believe appeal to be frivolous. s
Recent United States Supreme Court cases have emphasized that certain
duties are required of court-appointed counsel to protect an indigent's rights
of appeal. 0 The failure of a court-appointed counsel to be an active advocate on his client's behalf constitutes state action that deprives a defendant
of his constitutional rights.2 0 A court-appointed counsel may not forego his
client's right to appeal, even if he believes it to be frivolous, without acting
to guarantee the basic appellate rights of the client.2
in the case of trial proceedings the State leads the way." 229 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. 1969).
Cf. Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967) (where defendant's indigency and desire to appeal are manifest, he need not specifically request appointment of counsel).
10. Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
11. McDaniel v. State, 219 So. 2d 421, 423 (Fla. 1969) (where a letter from convicted
defendant to district court of appeal alleging indigency was forwarded to trial judge, there
was sufficient rebuttal of presumption); Schaeffer v. Wainwright, 218 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1969)
(defendant must at least inform the trial court of his desire to appeal before the court
need inquire as to his indigency).
12. FLA. CONsr. art. V, §§4(2), (3) provide, inter alia, that appeals from trial courts
may be taken to the proper appellate court as a matter of right.
13. FLA. R. APP. P. 3.2 (a) provides, inter alia, that an appeal is commenced by filing
a notice of appeal and depositing the filing fee.
14. 229 So. 2d 239, 242 (Fla. 1969).
15. ld.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969); Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967). See also Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967); and in the court of appeal,
Wainwright v. Simpson, 360 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1966).
20. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
21. Id. If court-appointed counsel conscientiously believes the appeal is frivolous, hq
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In Florida the duties of a court-appointed counsel to protect his client's
appellate rights have varied from district to district.22 One Florida court
expressed the fear that liberal rules emphasizing a defendant's right to
appellate counsel would encourage frivolous appeals by indigents and overburden public defenders.23 Other courts grant a hearing to an indigent
represented by counsel before deciding whether the appeal is frivolous and
counsel may withdraw.24 The reasoning in the instant decision may influence
the lower courts to adopt a more uniform and liberal approach. 25
When, as in the instant case, trial counsel was privately retained, but
the defendant subsequently becomes indigent, failure to provide counsel
during the critical period when an appeal must be filed 28 may effectively
foreclose appellate rights. A duty has never been imposed on a private
attorney to inform his client of his full rights on appeal when that attorney
will not prosecute the appeal himself.27 Thus, the defendant of intermediate
means must inform the court of his desire to appeal and his inability to
afford counsel or carry the appeal unassisted.
The presumption that a defendant represented by private counsel at trial
need not be informed of his right to have counsel appointed for appeal is
of dubious origin. Pate v. Holman28 relied on two lower court decisionsand on Noruell v. Illinois.3o The latter case held that a state may deny
post-conviction relief to a defendant who had counsel at trial but who failed
to appeal within the statutory time limit. The Court based its decision on
the presumption that the defendant retained his lawyer's continuing services.31 Noruell, however, is distinguishable from both Pate and the instant
case because it involved a situation in which the lower court transcripts were
no longer available.32 Pate itself questioned the validity of the presumption 33
because trial lawyers often leave their clients and do not appeal when they
should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw, at the same time supplying
the court and defendant with a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal. Id.
22. Compare Nelson v. State, 208 So. 2d 506 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968), with Gossett v.
State, 191 So. 2d 281 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966). In light of Anders v. California, 586 U.S. 738
(1967), the court in the instant case discarded the previous requirement that a defendant
who requests counsel for appeal must show arguable, reversable error at trial. 229 So. 2d
239, 243 (Fla. 1969).
23. Coleman v. State, 215 So. 2d 96 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Mobley v. State, 215 So. 2d
90 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Nelson v. State, 208 So. 2d 506 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
24. McCall v. State, 225 So. 2d 448 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
25. See generally 229 So. 2d at 242 (Fla. 1969).
26. FLA. R. ApP. P. 6.2 (appeal must be filed within 90 days after judgment is entered
or sentence imposed).
27. Cf. Lee v. State, 204 So. 2d 245 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
28. 341 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1965).
29. Horton v. Bomar, 230 F. Supp. 271 (M.D. Tenn. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 335 F.2d
583 (6th Cir. 1964); McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1963).
30. 373 U.S. 420 (1963).
31. See text accompanying notes 8-11 supra.
32. 373 U.S. at 423 (1963). Appellant sought a new trial fifteen years after his conviction. Id. at 421.
33. 341 F.2d at 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1965).
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become aware of their clients' indigency.34 In 1966 the federal court system
remedied this situation by revising the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Formerly, rule 37 (a) (2) required courts to advise an unrepresented
defendant after sentencing that, if he so desired, the clerk would prepare and
file a notice of appeal. 35 Now, rule 32 (a) (2) requires that a court advise a
defendant of his right to appeal in forma pauperis regardless of the presence
of counsel. 36 Florida courts, however, have continued to follow the Pate
decision and the court reaffirmed this position in the instant case. Courts have
recognized the laudability of the advisement now included in the Federal
Rules,37 but have not required its utilization as a matter of constitutional
right.38
Since Florida courts refuse to ground this advisement on a constitutional
basis, defendants might alternatively be protected if the duties of private
counsel were expanded. An attorney presumably has the ethical responsibility of informing a client, from whose case he withdraws, of his right to
appeal. 39 This alone, however, will not assure a defendant the desired
appellate review. A statute is apparently necessary to ensure to a defendant
of intermediate means the appellate access. Rule 1.670 of the Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure requires a trial judge to "inform the defendant concerning his rights of appeal therefrom, including the time allowed by law
for taking an appeal." This rule does not include an advisement either of
an unrepresented defendant's right to have the clerk file notice of appeal
or his right to have counsel appointed. The presumption that the defendant
who had private counsel at trial will have one for an appeal has limited
40
the intended function of rule 1.670.
41
A solution may lie in the Illinois statute directed to this problem:

34. The court cited statements contained in the 1964 Judicial Conference of the Second
Judicial Circuit, 36 F.R.D. 129, 153-54 (statements by L. Polsky, appellate counsel for the
Legal Aid Society in New York): "I think we all recognize that men have trial counsel,
men have appellate counsel. But what happens in between? . . . The present practice ...
in most districts is that when a trial counsel, if he is retained, loses his case and there is
no fee to be had for an appeal, he leaves his client .....
.[D]uring
this . . . critical
period [time for filing an appeal] many defendants are unrepresented, receive no advice
about how to proceed further, or how to protect their rights." Pate v. Holman, 841 F2d
764, 769 n.3 (5th Cir. 1965).
35. Fed. R. Crim. P. 37 (a) (2) (1964).
86. Fan. R. CRaM. P. 32 (a) (2) (1966).
37. See United States ex rel. Bjornsen v. LaVallee, 64 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1966).
88. 229 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. 1969).
39. E.g., ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 44. "The lawyer should not throw
up the unfinished task to the detriment of his client except for reasons of honor or selfrespect." See also People v. Brown, 39 Il1. 2d 307, 285 NXE.2d 562 (1968) (in the event of
nonpayment for an appeal, counsel's proper remedy is to move for withdrawal, rather than
to take no action and thereby forfeit his client's rights).
40. 229 So. 2d 289, 241 (Fla. 1969). See also Mobley v. State, 215 So. 2d 90, 93 (4th
D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, §605 (1967).
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In all cases in which the defendant is convicted of a felony, the trial
court shall, at the time of imposing sentence, advise the defendant of
his right to appeal, of his right to request the clerk to prepare and
file a notice of appeal, and of his right, if indigent, to be furnished,
without cost to him, with a transcript of the proceedings at his trial
and with counsel on appeal.
This statute would automatically insure to a defendant of intermediate means
the availability of counsel for appeal and advice concerning his rights.
At present, a defendant of intermediate means is not as fully protected
as an indigent in provision for counsel on appeal. This seems unjustifiable
since a solution would burden the trial court merely with a simple advisement to the defendant. The defendant who may be ignorant of his appellate
rights needs this protection, for when the right to counsel on appeal is lost,
the right to effective appeal is often foreclosed and justice may be denied
him merely because he is indigent. When, as in the instant case, a man can
afford counsel only through the trial stage, it is incongruous that he may
be denied his rights, in effect because he could initially afford counsel.
TERuANcE A.
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